Managing increasing traffic from Instant Messengers and P2P applications is becoming more important nowadays. We present an inkernel architecture of management gateway, namely kP2PADM, built upon open-source packages with several modifications and design techniques. First, the in-kernel design streamlines the data path through the gateway. Second, the dual-queue buffer eliminates head-of-line blocking for multiple connections. Third, a connection cache reduces useless reconnection attempts from the peers. Fourth, a fast-pass mechanism avoids slowing down the TCP transmission. The in-kernel design approximately doubles the throughput of the design in the user space. The internal benchmarks also analyze the impact of each function on performance. key words: P2P/IM management, gateway, in-kernel implementation
Introduction
The traffic of peer-to-peer (P2P) applications has dominated the Internet traffic lately [1] , [2] . Properly managing P2P traffic is therefore important. For example, Internet service providers can restrict P2P traffic to avoid excessive occupation of bandwidth. Restricting the use of instant messengers (IM) can increase employee productivity and prevent confidential information from leakage. Like firewalls, which control accesses from and to the intranet, a transparent gateway that centrally manages P2P traffic is a promising approach.
Managing P2P traffic** is more complicated than managing other traffic. Conventional approaches that identify applications according to fixed port numbers no longer work because most P2P applications run on dynamic ports and tend to hide themselves by encrypting the messages [3] . The authors in [4] , [5] indicate the insufficiency of detecting P2P traffic with port numbers. They analyze the P2P traffic and extract signatures from it for high detection accuracy. Some methods do not rely on signatures, but on characteristics of P2P traffic such as connection patterns [2] , [6] because the messages may be encrypted. These designs focus on in- *This work was supported in part by the Taiwan National Sci-could reduce the performance: useless reconnection requests from P2P applications and out-of-order packets. Some users or P2P applications persistently attempt to reconnect to their peers within a short period of time when the gateway blocks the connection establishment. Handling these attempts is wasteful, and they should be blocked again soon. This architecture deploys a connection cache to block reconnection requests as soon as possible. Out-of-order packets result in unnecessary packet retransmission because the gateway must queue them to maintain the order. The sender may consider the queueing as a sign of packet loss if its TCP retransmission timer expires or it receives three duplicated TCP ACKs from the peer. We use a mechanism called fast pass that passes out-of-order packets immediately, and duplicates a copy of each packet in the kernel for ordering and reassembly. This work proposes several strategies to resolve practical design issues of an efficient P2P management gateway. The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews typical P2P applications and surveys related packages and products. Section 3 presents the key ideas of the system architecture and details the implementation. Section 4 presents the performance evaluation of this system and analyzes the result. Section 5 concludes the study and indicates future work. and Skype (www.skype.com). Most P2P applications set the default port numbers upon installation, but the actual port numbers in use may be either changed by the users later or determined by the applications. P2P applications tend to circumvent the filtering of firewalls by running on dynamic ports or hiding themselves on wellknown ports. An example is Skype, which can choose the ports of HTTP and HTTPS in case of connection failure [8] . Kazaa can hop to another port if it is blocked in a port. Generally, it is impossible to tell the application from only the port number. Therefore, common solutions to identify P2P applications are based on signatures or heuristics on the connection patterns.
P2P applications may sequentially transfer a file from another peer, or in out-of-order segments. If a file is either encrypted or transferred out-of-order, performing virus scanning and auditing becomes intractable. For example, a user may download a file with a laptop in two different locations. The management gateway in either location sees only random fragments that are available. Only the laptop itself can reassemble and restore the original content. Therefore, we do not support both functions for applications that encrypt data or transfer data in an out-of-order manner. If the file name is visible, filtering can refer to the file name that contains specific keywords and block the file transfer. Moreover, enterprises may not want employees to leak out confidential information via chatting messages. Filtering sensitive keywords or recording the message is also needed. The kP2PADM architecture is designed to implement feasible management functions summarized in Table 2 .
Related Products and Implementations
P2P and IM traffic management has attracted much attention recently. We are aware of several commercial machines for the demand, such as Facetime (www.facetime.com) and Akonix (www.akonix.com), to name a few, as well as software tools such as p2pwatchdog (www.p2pwatchdog.com) and Terminator X (www.plevna.f9.co.uk).
These products can manage P2P/IM traffic by filtering and auditing messages on IM, block P2P traffic, detect malware, and so on. However, these products reveal little about the design due to their black-box nature, let alone evaluation of the internal functions.
This work prefers to integrate open-source packages into the kP2PADM management gateway. Packages such as L7-filter and IPP2P (www.ipp2p.org) are classifiers that identify P2P traffic by inspecting the packet payload in the Linux Netfilter subsystem (www.netfilter,org). The L7-filter uses Netfilter's connection-tracking module and checks only the content in the first eight packets of the application data after a connection is established. If the application data contain the signatures, the module marks the entire connection as identified. IPP2P checks every packet in a connection. It embeds the signatures in the source code, while the L7-filter loads signatures from the files. Because the L7-filter inspects fewer packets and dynamically loads signatures, it has higher performance and better flexibility than IPP2P. This work therefore integrates the L7-filter as the classifier. Note that although it is possible to use Netfilter alone to perform basic shaping, classifying and filtering, the kP2PADM gateway can do more beyond that.
Implementation in the kernel space can reduce moving data between the kernel/user space and increase the system performance. The authors in [9] presented the connectionsplicing technique to speed up data forwarding in the kernel level. The idea of in-kernel implementation is also applied to a Web proxy and a Web switch to improve the efficiency [10], [11] . A Web Server named kHTTPd (www.fenrus.demon.nl) running as a Linux module also shows higher performance than user-space Web servers of Apache and Zeus. Their success tantalized us to implement an in-kernel design of the management gateway. In Sect. 4.2, we will compare the performance of the in-kernel design and the in-daemon design that runs in the user space.
3. Design of System Architecture P2P connection classification involves examining application messages, which are available only after a TCP connection between two peers is established. Because the gateway transparently monitors the traffic, a peer does not have to establish a connection with the gateway. When the gateway monitors and discovers a new connection, it redirects the connection from the kernel to the kernel module for the following processing.
Main Ideas of the Design

Connection Classification and Marking
The L7-filter collects at most the first eight packets to reassemble application messages for signature matching. A predefined protocol number that indicates the traffic type is assigned to a connection identified as P2P traffic. The kernel then filters undesirable traffic and controls the available bandwidth according to this number. Note that the packets containing important information such as the file name or size might have been already passed to the peer before the traffic type is identified. Because the kernel module may still need such information to take the actions, the collected application data are packed into a special packet created inside the kernel for each connection. This packet is only internally passed to the kernel module for extracting the application data and further processing.
Packet Queueing and Redirecting
Two packet queues Q1 and Q2 are created in the kernel to manage P2P traffic. All packets identified by the L7-filter are queued in Q1, while the unidentified packets are just passed through the gateway. The queued packets (actually, only the pointers to the packets for efficiency) are passed to the kernel module, which processes these packets and sequentially sets the verdict on them. The verdict includes The other situation to move packets from Q1 to Q2 is when the packet sequence is incorrect and the connection is in the processing state. See Fig. 3 for the flow chart.
data.
The packets are checked based on the application protocol to examine whether a chatting message or a file request contains specific keywords. If a keyword is found , the kernel module instructs the kernel to drop the packet as well as the subsequent packets in the same connection , and then sends an RST packet to the source peer to tear down the connection; otherwise the kernel will pass the packet and record the chatting message or file name in an external storage if auditing is enabled. Bandwidth control is in this stage by limiting the bandwidth occupied by a connection. If the packet should not be blocked, the connection is marked to be in the receiving state. The subsequent data segments are then reassembled, and virus scanning is performed if needed .
Virus Scanning for Shared File
A buffer is allocated for receiving a connection to be scanned for viruses. When the kernel module receives a packet, it first checks whether the buffer is full or whether the packet is the last one in the transferred file. If either happens, a virus scanning program (We use the code from ClamAV (www.clamav.net) in the user space performs virus scanning on the buffer. If a virus is found, the program tells the kernel to drop the packets to destroy the file, and sends an RST packet to the peer to tear down the connection; otherwise, the packets are passed.
The above method may have two problems: head-ofline blocking and segmentation of virus signatures. First, head-of-line blocking occurs due to the time-consuming virus scanning. The subsequent packets queued in Q1 cannot be handled until virus scanning on the buffer is finished. Because this will constrain the throughput of the entire system, the connection to be scanned is marked as in the processing state, and another thread is called to perform virus scanning. The subsequent packets of the same connection will be moved from Q1 to Q2, so the packets in other connections can be immediately handled. If a virus is found, the packets in Q2 associated with this connection will be dropped; otherwise, they are moved back from Q2 to Q1. Figure 2 compares packet processing with and without handling the head-of-line blocking. Without head-of-line blocking, processing the packets in other connections can be interleaved with virus scanning. Second, a virus signature may span two consecutive buffers, so it will not be found in either buffer. To avoid missing a match, after a buffer has been scanned, the buffer tail of s-1 characters will be moved to the prefix of the next buffer, where s is the maximum length of virus signatures. The signature therefore can be found in the next buffer.
Reconnection Problems
A connection cache can keep the information of a blocked connection and recognize its reconnection. Initially, the packets in all connections can pass through the connection cache and be processed by kP2PADM because no connec- tions have been marked as denied ones. If a connection is blocked, its four tuples of source IP address, destination IP address, destination port number and protocol identifier will be recorded in the connection cache. The subsequent packets having the same four tuples are viewed as in the reconnection, even though their source port numbers are different . The source port number is not counted because P2P applications, say BitTorrent, may switch to different source port numbers when their connections are blocked. The connection cache will immediately drop a reconnection to increase the performance.
Fast Pass for Out-of-Order Packets
If an packet is queued in the gateway for packet reordering, a sender may view the out-of-order packet as being lost, and retransmit it or enter the slow-start process. However, the retransmission is redundant or the slow-start is unnecessary because it is not due to packet loss, but due to the queueing of out-of-order packets in the gateway. The redundant retransmission will decrease the throughput. This design prefers to immediately pass out-of-order packets, so that the receiver can soon respond with ACKs to reduce the redundant retransmission and avoid slow-start as usual. A copy of each out-of-order packet is kept in the gateway for reassembly and examination. This mechanism is called fast pass in the design.
System Implementation
The system is multi-threaded. The main thread in the kernel module gets packets from Q1 in the kernel and performs the pre-processing tasks. Because Q1 contains packets from various connections, the kernel module uses the application number to identify the P2P protocol, and the main thread invokes an application thread to handle each connection related to that protocol. Figure 3 illustrates the entire flow of the main thread. After performing the pre-processing tasks, the main thread checks the connection state. If the connec-tion is in the processing state, the main thread handles the head-of-line blocking problem; otherwise, it signals a specific application thread to handle the packets. cesses demand the CPU.
Performance Evaluation
Benchmarking Environment
We perform various benchmarks on kP2PADM installed on a PC with Pentium III 1GHz CPU and 512MB SDRAM. Figure 6 presents the topology of the testing environment.
Two HTTP clients and three Web servers are in the test bed. Each client creates 100 threads for each server, and each thread downloads a 2MB file from the three Web servers.
Although the file size is small compared with some shared Fig. 4 The flow chart of an application thread. Fig. 5 The operation of the kP2PADM architecture. Fig. 6 The topology of the testing environment. 1. Pure NAT: the pure NAT function only translates between private and public IP addresses.
NAT+packet queueing:
Besides NAT, every packet is queued in the kernel. kP2PADM just instructs the kernel to pass the packets without any further processing. 3. NAT+packet queueing+L7:
Besides the above two, the L7-filter is enabled with 20 rules. This configuration assesses the performance impact from the L7-filter. 4. P2P proxy+filtering:
All functions of P2P management are enabled except virus scanning and auditing. This configuration enables filtering transferred files according to the file name. 5. P2P proxy+auditing:
The P2P proxy plus the auditing function on transferred files, and records the files into the file system. 6. P2P proxy+virus scanning:
The P2P proxy plus virus scanning on the transferred files.
P2P proxy+filtering+auditing+virus scanning:
The P2P proxy with all the above functions enabled. 
